of the organism in function and form. [He seems to forget that in the early days of science David Hume said much the same of causation in general.] This means nothing more than : it is "as if" this preservation were willed or intended; but in the " as if " there lies also the implication that nothing is or can be known of the " willing " and " intending ", nor of a willing or intending subject. Since only the maintenance, production, and restoration of the organism as one whole in function and form appear as " purposive" in the organic, or the special relation of a partial function to the total function of the whole, the " consideration of purpose " is to be replaced by that of " wholeness ".' And he cites Ungerer with approval to the following effect: * The teleological point of view in the sense here intended is quite free from hypothesis. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that nothing mental is presupposed nor is a law of purposive-ness of reactions put forward.[5] He goes on to say: ' Thus we see that organismic description of vital pro-cesses does not in any way constitute an " explanation " ; it leaves the question open of how the maintenance of organic wholeness is achieved. The organismic stand-point neither asserts nor denies that the processes through which this is brought about are reducible to the phenomena of inorganic nature.'

From all of which it would seem that for Bertalanfiy organicism is a heuristic principle of description merely, with a prejudice (in his case at least), in favour of mechanistic explanation, if and when such

explanation may become possible in some remote future. Yet it is more than that. * Alongside the causal and organismic there is yet a third form of description necessary in relation to organisms. This third form is the *historical,* which de-